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Authorities will be able to guarantee open space without themselves buy-
ing land, regardless of the owner's economic loss, as long as the remaining
allowable uses are reasonable. The power to zone will be limited only
insofar as it permits public access to the open space that results in a
physical invasion. The result may be that while a city or state can
guarantee open space for public viewing, it cannot guarantee public access
to that open space without paying the landowner.
ALVIN W. ROHRS
PARTIAL EXEMPTION FROMPROPERTY TAXES
Barnes Hospital v. Leggett'
Barnes Hospital (Barnes), a tax exempt organization, owned and used
Queeny Tower, a seventeen-story building, for the tax exempt purpose of
treating patients and providing them with care and services. 2 Part of
Queeny Tower was leased to Washington University Medical School,
whose teaching facilities were located within the Barnes Hospital complex
and whose faculty members comprised the medical staff of the hospital. 3
Washington University subleased offices in Queeny Tower to its part-time
faculty for use in their private practices. Because the portions subleased
were used for commercial office space, the City of St. Louis placed Queeny
Tower on its assessment rolls for 1978. The city asserted that the building
had not been used exclusively4 for tax exempt purposes and therefore was
1. 589 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
2. Id. at 242.
3. An exemption is not lost when one tax exempt entity leases a portion of
its building to another tax exempt entity, provided the building is still used for ex-
empt purposes. See, e.g., Christ The Good Shepherd Lutheran Church v.
Mathiesen, 81 Cal. App. 3d 355, 146 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1978); Childrens Dev.
Center, Inc. v. Olson, 52 Ill. 2d 332, 288 N.E.2d 388 (1972); Department of
Revenue v. Central Medical Laboratory, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1977); Com-
munity Hosp. Linen Servs., Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 309 Minn. 447,
245 N.W.2d 190 (1976); Sisters of Charity v. County of Bernalillo, 93 N.M. 42,
596 P.2d 255 (1979).
4. MO. CONST. art. X, § 6 states, "[A]ll property, real and personal, not
held for private or corporate profit and used exclusively for religious worship, for
schools and colleges, for purposes purely charitable, or for agricultural and hor-
ticultural societies may be exempted from taxation by general law."
RSMO § 137.100(5) (1978) exempts from taxation "[a]ll property, real and
personal, actually and regularly used exclusively for religious worship, for schools
1
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not entitled to a tax exemption .5 Barnes brought suit in the Circuit Court
of the City of St. Louis, arguing that the doctors' offices, although
operated for a commercial purpose, were incidental to the primary
charitable use of the building and were necessary for the efficient func-
tioning of a modem hospital. The trial court found for Barnes, holding
that the office rental did not cause the building to lose its tax exempt
status.6 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court held that "property"
could mean a portion of a building, concluding that for reasons later
discussed, buildings should no longer be treated as indivisible entities.
Queeny Tower, therefore, could receive a partial tax exemption and
should be assessed for the value of the doctors' offices. 7 The court overruled
a long line of prior decisions which stated that buildings must be treated
as indivisible entities for tax purposes: they must be either fully taxed or
fully exempt.8 The court also overruled cases that allowed buildings used
only incidentally for nonexempt purposes to receive a full exemption. 9
The Barnes decision will affect significantly the tax exempt status of
dual use buildings, i.e., buildings that are used for both exempt and
nonexempt tax purposes. The decision places Missouri among the major-
ity of states, which recognizes partial exemption of buildings from taxa-
tion. 10 It also appears that dual use buildings that received an exemption
and colleges, or for purposes puiely charitable and not held for private or cor-
porate profit ...."
5. 589 S.W.2d at 242. Queeny Tower was built in 1965, and in 1966, of-
fices were leased to Washington University faculty members. The tower was
assessed by the City of St. Louis in 1966 because of the office rental. Taxation of
the tower was denied in Trustees of Barnes Hosp. v. Sansone, No. 1966-262 (Mo.
State Tax Comm'n 1967). Queeny Tower was assessed once again by the city in
1978. It asserted that St. John's Mercy Hosp. v. Leachman, 552 S.W.2d 723 (Mo.
En Banc 1977) supported the assessment. In St. John's, the supreme court denied
exemption to a hospital that used 56% of its floor space for private medical prac-
tice.
6. 589 S.W.2d at 243.
7. Id. at 244.
8. Id. at 243. Partial exemption was denied in the following cases: St.
John's Mercy Hosp. v. Leachman, 552 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Mo. En Banc 1977) (no
exemption when 56% of hospital was leased to doctors for private offices);
Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. Hoehn, 355 Mo. 257, 269-70, 196 S.W.2d 134,
143-44 (1946) (use of profits from leased portion of building is not controlling; en-
tire property must be used for tax exempt purposes); Wyman v. City of St. Louis,
17 Mo. 335, 337-38 (1852) (entire building assessed when part of school was leased
for commercial purposes). See text accompanying note 15 infra. For a more
detailed discussion of these cases, see Partial Tax Exemption of Charitable
Organizations in Missouri, 49 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 127, 127-29 (1980).
9. 589 S.W.2d ai 244. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text infra.
10. The following cases interpreted express "used exclusively" language or
its equivalent and allowed partial exemption: Greater Anchorage Area Borough
v. Sisters of Charity, 553 P.2d 467 (Alaska 1976); Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v.
876 [Vol. 46
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County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221 P.2d 31 (1950); Hanagan v. Rocky
Ford Knights of Pythias Bldg. Ass'n, 101 Colo. 545, 75 P.2d 780 (1938); Hartford
Hosp. v. City & Town, 160 Conn. 370, 279 A.2d 561 (1971); State ex rel. Cragor
Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 491, 8 So. 2d 17 (1942) (Florida now has statutory provisions
for partial exemption. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.1,96(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1981));
Smith v. Board of Review, 305 111. 38, 136 N.E. 787 (1922); Trustees of Iowa Col-
lege v. Baillie, 236 Iowa 235, 17 N.W.2d 143 (1945); Grand Lodge v. City of New
Orleans, 44 La. Ann. 659, 11 So. 148 (1891); County Comm'rs v. Sisters of Chari-
ty, 48 Md. 34 (1878); Detroit Young Men's Soc'y v. Mayor of Detroit, 3 Mich. 172
(1874); Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549, 38 N.W.2d 803
(1949); Board of Supervisors v. Vicksburg Hosp., Inc., 173 Miss. 805, 163 So. 382
(1935); Northwestern Improvement Co. v. Rosebud County, 129 Mont. 412, 288
P.2d 657 (1955); YMCA v. Lancaster County, 106 Neb. 105, 182 N.W. 593
(1921); Congregation Gedulath Mordecai v. City of New York, 135 Misc. 823,
238 N.Y.S. 525 (1929); New Haven Church of Missionary Baptist v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 9 Ohio St. 2d 53, 223 N.E.2d 366 (1967) (Ohio now has statutory provi-
sions dealing with partial exemption. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5713.04 (Page
1980)); Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 156 P.2d 340
(1945); Parker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961 (1901); Columbia Hosp. Ass'n v.
City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660, 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967); Independent Order
of Odd Fellows v. Scott, 24 Wyo. 544, 163 P. 306 (1917). See also Piedmont
Memorial Hosp. v. Guilford, 218 N.C. 673, 680, 12 S.E.2d 265, 269 (194A) (par-
tial tax credit allowed) (North Carolina now has statute addressing pardal ex-
emption. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-278.3 (e)-(g) (1979)); City of Columbia v. Tin-
dal, 43 S.C. 547, 22 S.E. 341 (1895) (sheriff enjoined from selling city hall, which
had been used, in part, for nonexempt purposes).
The following cases allowed partial exemption, but the provisions interpreted
did not include the "used exclusively" language or its equivalent: Massenburg v.
Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 212, 7 S.E. 636 (1888); Sahara Grotto & Styx, Inc. v. State
Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 147 Ind. App. 471, 261 N.E.2d 873 (1970); City of
Louisville v. Board of Trade, 90 Ky. 409, 14 S.W. 408 (1890); City of Lewiston v.
All Maine Fair Ass'n, 138 Me. 39, 21 A.2d 625 (1941); Milton Hosp. & Convales-
cent Home v. Board of Assessors, 360 Mass. 63, 271 N.E.2d 745 (1971); Trustees
of Phillips-Exeter Academy v. Exeter, 90 N.H. 472, 27 A.2d 569 (1940); Sisters of
Charity v. County of Bernalillo, 93 N.M. 42, 596 P.2d 255 (1979); Philadelphia
v. Barber, 160 Pa. 123, 28 A. 644 (1894); Wilson's Modern Business College v.
King County, 4 Wash. 2d 636, 104 P.2d 580 (1940).
Hawaii, Idaho, and Nevada have no cases regarding partial exemption, but
they do have statutory provisions allowing partial exemption. HAWAII REv.
STAT. § 246-32(d) (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 63-105c (Cum. Supp. 1980);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 361.135(3) (1979).
The following cases interpreted express "used exclusively" language or its
equivalent and did not allow partial exemption: State v. Bridges, 246 Ala. 486,
21 So. 2d 316 (1945); Defenders of Christian Faith v. Board of County Comm'rs,
219 Kan. 181, 547 P.2d 706 (1976); Borough of Cresskill v. Northern Valley
Evangelical Free Church, 125 N.J. Super. 585, 312 A.2d 641 (App. Div. 1973); In
re City of Pautucket, 24 R.I. 86, 52 A.2d 679 (1902); State ex rel. Hayes v. Board
of Equalization, 16 S.D. 219, 92 N.W. 16 (1902); Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68
Tex. 698, 5 S.W. 519 (1887); State v. McDowell Lodge, 96 W. Va 611, 123 S.E.
561 (1924).
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in the past, because their nonexempt use was incidental to their exempt
use, now will be taxed on the nonexempt portion of the building.1" The
Barnes decision leaves unanswered, however, the questions of the extent to
which a lien attaches to partially exempt property2 and the valuation
method to assess partially exempt property. 3
Both the Missouri Constitution and the Revised Statutes of Missouri
require that for property to be exempt, it must be "used exclusively" for ex-
empt purposes.' 4 When the property is a lot or acreage that can divided
easily and separately assessed, this requirement has led to few problems.
The difficulties arise when a building is used for dual purposes. The
Missouri Supreme Court, when first confronted with the question of par-
tial exemption, held that any nonexempt use of a building rendered the
entire building subject to taxation on its full value.15 This strict interpreta-
tion of the used exclusively clause was relaxed in later decisions, which
allowed total exemption for dual use buildings when the nonexempt use
was incidental to the exempt use.' 6 This less stringent interpretation of the
used exclusively requirement was identified as the "principal use" rule in a
noted tax treatise' 7 and is identified as the Spillers' rule or "dovetails into
or rounds out" rule by Missouri courts.' The principal use rule is thought
to be consistent with a legislative intent to encourage charitable, educa-
tional, and religious activities, and has been adopted in states with statutes
similar to Missouri's. 19
11. See notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 37-53 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 54-57 and accompanying text infra.
14. See note 4 supra.
15. Wyman v. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335, 337-38 (1852).
16. City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 839, 846 (Mo. En
Banc 1975) (occasional rental for non-profit purposes does not cause building to
lose its tax exempt status); Bethesda Gen. Hosp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 396
S.W.2d 631, 635 (Mo. 1965) (residences of key hospital personnel within hospital
are incidental to charitable purpose); State ex rel. Spillers v. Johnston, 214 Mo.
656, 663, 113 S.W. 1083, 1085 (1908) (headmaster's residence within school
building did not cause school to lose tax exempt status) (overruled by Barnes).
17. 2 T. COOLEY, TAXATION 658, 686 (4th ed. 1924).
18. St. Louis County v. Christian Hosp. Northwest St. Louis County, 589
S.W.2d 246, 248 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
19. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 221
P.2d 31 (1950); First Unitarian Soc'y of Hartford v. Town of Hartford, 66 Conn.
3681 34 A. 89 (1895); Illinois Inst. of Technology v. Skinner, 49 Ill. 2d 59, 273
N.E.2d 371 (1971); State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann.
223, 26 So. 872 (1898); Webb Academy v. City of Grand Rapids, 209 Mich. 523,
177 N.W. 290 (1920); Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549,
38 N.W.2d 803 (1949); Lincoln Woman's Club v. City of Lincoln, 178 Neb. 357,
133 N.W.2d 455 (1965); St. Paul's Church v. Concord, 75 N.H. 420, 75 A. 531
(1910); Township of Princeton v. Tenacre Foundation, 69 N.J. Super. 559, 174
A.2d 601 (App. Div. 1961); Pace College v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d 528, 151 N.E.2c
900, 176 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1958); Willamette Univ. v. State Tax Comm'n, 245 Or.
878 [Vol. 46
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The Barnes court discarded the principal use rule, even though adop-
tion of the partial exemption rule did not necessitate such an action. The
rules are not mutually exclusive and have been employed simultaneously
in other states.2 0 Additionally, the court did not indicate how to deal with
the assessment of or a lien against partially exempt property even though
those two problems had been cited as primary reasons for the rejection of
partial exemption prior to Barnes.21 Any doubt that Barnes abandoned
the principal use rule, however, was dispelled by St. Louis County v. Chris-
tian Hospital Northwest St. Louis County,22 a companion to the Barnes
case. In Christian Hospital, the court allowed a dual use building to
receive total exemption based on the principal use rule, but stated that the
result would have been different if Barnes had been retroactive. 23
342, 422 P.2d 260 (1966); Engineers & Scientists of Milwaukee, Inc. v. City of
Milwaukee, 38 Wis. 2d 550, 157 N.W.2d 572 (1968); Hardin v. Rock Springs
Lodge, 23 Wyo. 522, 154 P. 323 (1916). But see Greater Anchorage Area
Borough v. Sisters of Charity, 553 P.2d 467, 468, 469-70 (Alaska 1976) (any por-
tion of property exempted must be used entirely for exempt purposes; doctor's of-
fices not exempt even though incidental to purpose of hospital); Township of
Teaneck v. Lutheran Bible Inst., 20 N.J. 86, 90-91, 118 A.2d 809, 810-11 (1955)
(faculty residences not incidental to educational purpose of school; all doubts
resolved against taxpayer).
20. Illinois Inst. of Technology v. Skinner, 49 Ill. 2d 59, 273 N.E.2d 371
(1971); Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549, 38 N.W.2d 803
(1949); Pace College v. Boyland, 4 N.Y.2d 528, 151 N.E.2d 900, 176 N.Y.S.2d
356 (1958); Multnomah School of the Bible v. Multnomah County, 218 Or. 19,
343 P.2d 893 (1959); Hardin v. Rock Springs Lodge, 23 Wyo. 522, 154 P. 323
(1916).
The following cases allowed exemption when the nonexempt use is a necessary
use: Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. v. County of Los Angeles, 35 Cal. 2d 729, 736-37,
221 P.2d 31, 35-37 (1950) (residences of hospital staff members necessary to effi-
cient function of modern hospital and, therefore, tax exempt); Hartford Hosp. v.
City & Town, 160 Conn. 370, 377-78, 279 A.2d 561, 563-64 (1971) (apartments
rented to doctors used for hospital purpose); Township of Princeton v. Tenacre
Foundation, 69 N.J. Super. 559, 565, 174 A.2d 601, 605 (App. Div. 1961)
(residence of sanitorium director necessary to function of sanitorium and,
therefore, tax exempt); Columbia Hosp. Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d
660, 672-73, 151 N.W.2d 750, 756-57 (1967) (hospital living quarters for interns
and doctors necessary to function of the hospital and, therefore, tax exempt). But
see Doctors Hosp. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 283, 284-85, 181
N.E.2d 702, 704 (1962) (quarters supplied to married interns and residents not
tax exempt); Warren, Krattenmaker & Snyder, Property Tax Exemptions for
Charitable, Educational, Religious and Governmental Institutions in Connec-
ticut, 4 CONN. L. REV. 181, 243 (1971).
21. See generally Wyman v. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo. 335, 337-38 (1852).
22. 589 S.W.2d 246 (Mo. En Banc 1979).
23. Id. at 249. In Christian Hospital, the court stated that the "dovetails
into or rounds out" rule that had first been employed in State ex rel. Spillers v.
Johnston, 214 Mo. 656, 663, 113 S.W. 1083, 1085 (1908), had been overruled in
the Barnes decision. Barnes, however, was not applied retroactively and the
5
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In Barnes, the court stated that it recognized the effect of modem
technology on property ownership and was reacting to the resulting
change in the utilization of buildings by adopting the partial exemption
rule. 24 With the adoption of the partial exemption rule, a charitable
organization no longer loses its tax exempt status if it rents one floor of a
multi-story building to a commercial enterprise. The court reasoned that
the partial exemption rule accurately reflects the legislative intent behind
tax exemption legislation. 25 Tax exempt organizations now may build effi-
ciently and utilize vertical as well as horizontal space without losing tax ex-
emption of portions of their property used for exempt purposes.
It can be argued that although the court recognized legislative intent
when it accepted the partial exemption rule, it controverted legislative in-
tent when it rejected the principal use rule. States other than Missouri that
allow partial exemption are split in their treatment of the principal use
rule. Alaska allows exemption of portions of a building only if each portion
is used exclusively for an exempt purpose. 2 6 Some states allow exemption
of a portion when the use of the nonexempt portion is necessary to the
function of the exempt purpose of the rest of the building.27 Several states
simply have allowed partial exemption without changing the principal use
rule previously recognized in the state. 28
Entities that occasionally rent portions of their exempt buildings for
nonexempt activities will suffer a tax disadvantage under the Barnes deci-
sion unless Missouri fills the gap left by the repudiation of the principal use
rule. If Barnes is strictly interpreted, the occasional rental of building
space for nonexempt uses will cause the rented portions to lose their tax ex-
empt status29 because these portions will not be used exclusively for exempt
dovetail rule governed the Christian Hospital case. 589 S.W.2d at 249. Christian
Hospital leased 2.6% of its hospital floor space to its staff doctors for private of-
fice use. The supreme court ruled that the lease of offices was incidental to the
charitable use of the hospital and, therefore, entitled the entire property to a tax
exemption. Id. at 247, 249.
24. 589 S.W.2d at 243-44.
25. Id. at 244. Although it acknowledged that changes in the law should be
made by the legislature rather than the courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
changed the law and allowed partial exemption. It stated that its prior decisions
disallowing partial exemption obviously were incorrect and that the needed
change required an interpretation of the state constitution, which the legislature
could not change. Oklahoma County v. Queen City Lodge, 195 Okla. 131, 152,
156 P.2d 340, 358 (1945). Partial exemption is recognized in the majority of
states. See note 10 supra.
26. Greater Anchorage Area Borough v. Sisters of Charity, 553 P. 2d 467
(Alaska 1976).
27. See cases cited note 20 supra.
28. See id.
29. Any organization that previously relied on the principal use rule to gain
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purposes, even if the occasional rental is de minimisY°
To prevent the complete loss of the rented portion's tax exempt status,
Missouri could assess the property at the value of the time spent for nonex-
empt uses. 3 1 To fill the gap left by the absence of the principal use rule,
Missouri also could expand the definition of the exempt use of the
building. Thus, if "purpose" is broadened, the "used exclusively" require-
ment will be easier to meet.3 2 Additionally, it could be argued that taxa-
30. The Barnes court stated that property must meet the following provi-
sions, first enunicated in Franciscan Tertiary Province of Mo., Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 566 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. En Banc 1978), in order to qualify for tax exemp-
tion:
it [property] must be actually and regularly used exclusively for purposes
purely charitable as "charity" is defined in Salvation Army v. Hoehn, 354
Mo. 107, 114, 115, 188 S.W.2d 826, 830 (1945); (2) it must be owned
and operated on a not-for-profit basis; and (3) the dominant use of the
property must be for the benefit of an indefinite number of people and
must directly or indirectly benefit society generally.
589 S.W.2d at 244. Thus, to meet the first proviso of the qualification require-
ment, the statutory phrase "used exclusively" must be interpreted. Without the
Spillers' definition of "used exclusively," the phrase could mean "solely" or "en-
tirely."
In City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n, 524 S.W.2d 839, 846.(Mo. En Banc
1975), the court held that the occasional rental of the exempt building for limited
social gatherings did not destroy the exemption. Without Spillers' liberal inter-
pretation of the exclusivity requirement, the statutory provisions for tax exemp-
tion would not have been fullfilled. There is a distinction, however, between
buildings that are used infrequently for nonexempt purposes and those that are
used, in part, solely for nonexempt purposes. Before Barnes, the principal use
rule was applied in both situations. The former situation was what occured in
Spillers and the latter was the situation in City of St. Louis v. State Tax Comm'n,
524 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
31. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Carter County, 175 Okla. 572, 573, 54 P.2d
155, 156 (1936) (pro rata taxation of oil and gas equipment used for exempt and
nonexempt purposes). But see Evangelical Covenant Church v. City of Nome,
394 P.2d 882, 885 (Alaska 1964) (radio station used primarily to broadcast
religious material denied tax exempt status when it also sold some commercial air
time); Hilger v. Harding College, Inc., 331 S.W.2d 851, 857 (Ark. 1960) (print-
ing press not exempt from taxation since only 90% of printing was done for col-
lege).
32. For example, the restaurant and lodging facilities of a YMCA are
money-making, commercial activities, yet they are not taxed in Missouri because
they are supplemental to the charitable purpose of the organization. The primary
purpose of the lodging and restaurant facilities is to provide for the welfare of
young men; the commercial aspect of the facilities is secondary. YMCA v. Sestric,
362 Mo. 551, 564-65, 242 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Mo. En Banc 1951). Along the same
lines, the exempt status of not for profit hospitals is not revoked when they charge
patients. The definition of charity is expanded to allow necessary charges as long
as indigents are also provided with services. Jackson County v. State Tax
Comm'n, 521 S.W.2d 378, 383 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
1981]
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tion of a nonexempt portion of a building is improper when the nonex-
empt use is necessary to the use of the rest of the building.3
It is also possible to argue that a portion of a building should be taxed
when its use is devoted entirely to a nonexempt purpose, but that it should
not be taxed if it is used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes, and the
nonexempt use is merely occasional.34 Taxation of a portion of a building
thus would occur only in situations like Barnes, when the portion was used
solely for nonexempt purposes. Exempt organizations could allow occa-
sional nonexempt use of a portion of their building without fearing taxa-
tion on that portion, yet a portion that was continously used for a nonex-
empt purpose would be taxed. Allowing the exemption of portions of ex-
empt buildings used occasionally for nonexempt uses is recognized in other
states, 35 and would conform to statements made in Missouri cases regard-
ing the legislative intent behind tax exemption legislation. 6
Although the Barnes decision to allow partial exemption was a step
forward, its failure to describe the attachment of a tax lien to partially ex-
empt property diminished the stride of this step. There are four ways to
handle the tax lien problem: (1) allow no tax lien on any portion of partially
exempt property,3 7 (2) allow a lien on the entire property, 8 (3) allow a lien
on an undivided part of the entire property, 39 or (4) allow a lien only on the
nonexempt portion of the property. 40 Each approach creates problems
that may be difficult to resolve without statutory provisions. No single ap-
proach is best for all situations. The lien problem is similar to that con-
fronted by cotenants of houses who have a collateral agreement for time
sharing. 41
By statute, Missouri provides that all property subject to taxation is
subject to a tax lien. The first way to handle the problem, therefore, is an
unlikely solution because a lien will attach to partially exempt property in
Missouri. 42 If the property can be divided in kind, however, it appears that
33. It is irrational to deny exemption of activities that are not themselves tax
exempt but that are essential to a tax exempt activity; otherwise, the tax exempt
activity becomes difficult. The problem can be alleviated by expanding the
definition of tax exempt purpose or allowing exemption for necessary, nonex-
empt activities. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
34. See note 30 supra.
35. See note 20 supra.
36. Essentially, this would mean recognizing the principal use rule in situa-
tions unlike Barnes, where the nonexempt use was only occasional. See note 30
supra.
37. See notes 42 & 43 and accompanying text infra.
38. See notes 44-46 and accompanying text infra.
39. See notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text infra.
40. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text infra.
41. See Comment, Legal Challenges to Time Sharing Ownership, 45 Mo.
L. REV. 423, 428-32 (1980).
42. RSMo § 137.085.2 (1978) (state lien on real property).
[Vol. 46882
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a lien would not attach to the exempt part of the property. When division
in kind is possible, the property could be assessed separately.4 3
Courts in other states have been unwilling to protect dual use property
from a tax lien and have chosen the second way to handle the problem.
These courts have indicated that nonpayment of taxes will result in a lien
attachment to the entire building. 44 The indication in those states is that
partial exemption is but a tax reduction and that the entire property is still
taxable. The partial exemption of a building acts only as a reduction of the
total tax assessment of the entire building. 4 The attachment of a lien to an
entire building when taxes of a portion of that building have not been paid
can be compared to statutes allowing a judgment to create a lien against
real property held by the judgment debtor. One court has stated, however,
that it would be unconstitutional to allow a lien to attach to an entire prop-
erty when a portion of it is tax exempt. 4 6
The third way to handle the tax lien problem is to allow the lien to at-
tach to an undivided part of the entire property. 47 The purchaser at the
tax sale thus becomes a tenant in common with the owner of the exempt
portion of the building. 48 The interest in the property acquired at the tax
43. There is no problem in separately assessing nonexempt property when it
can be separated in a legal manner from exempt property. Only the nonexempt
property would be listed on the assessment rolls and, therefore, be subject to a lien
for nonpayment of taxes. Public policy dictates that as little property as possible
be sold at tax sales. Sale of part of a nonexempt property to satisfy taxes due on
the whole is preferred over sale of the whole property. Lots should not be lumped
together and sold for nonpayment of taxes. Each lot should be sold individually so
the fewest possible lots will be sold. See generally RSMO § 140.200 (1978) (sale
when owner has several lots).
44. See State ex rel. Cragor Co. v. Doss, 150 Fla. 491,495, 8 So. 2d 17, 18-19
(1942); City of Lewiston v. All Maine Fair Ass'n, 138 Me. 39, 43, 21 A.2d 625, 627
(1941); Detroit Young Men's Soc'y v. Mayor of Detroit, 3 Mich. 172, 182 (1854);
Hibernian Benevolent Soc'y v. Kelly, 28 Or. 173, 196-97, 42 P. 3, 6 (1895). But
see YMCA v. Department of Revenue, 268 Or. 633, 639, 522 P.2d 464, 466
(1974) (court held space used for commercial shops in YMCA could be assessed,
indicating that lien would attach only to nonexempt portion).
45. This is analogous to homestead exemptions in some states where the
assessed value of the property is reduced proportionately by the homestead ex-
emption. E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2413 (West 1966). It is also similar to
the cases that excluded oil and gas reserves from the assessed valuation of certain
property. See 2 C. WILLIAMS & H. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 213.3 (1981).
46. Defenders of the Christian Faith v. Board of County Comm'rs, 219 Kan.
181, 189, 547 P.2d 706, 712 (1976). The court did not state the nature of the con-
stitutional problem. Selling exempt property could be viewed as an unauthorized
taking of property without due process if partial exemption is not regarded as a
form of assessment reduction.
47. See Christian Business Men's Comm. v. State, 228 Minn. 549, 558, 38
N.W.2d 803, 811 (1949).
48. Id. (by implication).
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sale is equal to the proportion of the value that the nonexempt portion of
the property bore to the value of the entire building. The purchaser can
bring a suit in partition to liquidate his interest in the property. This power
to liquidate avoids the difficulty of finding a purchaser for a single room or
a single floor of a building. It can be argued, however, that it is unfair to
sell a partial interest in an entire building when a specific part of the
building is exempt from taxation because the result of a sale generally will
be that the exempt owner of the building will lose his ownership interest.
The fourth way to handle the problem is to allow the lien to attach to
the portion of the building that is not tax exempt. 49 A purchaser at a tax
sale would buy only the nonexempt portion of the building. This is
analogous to the result reached in Missouri when a lien is attached on a
condominium. A condominium is a property made up of units that are
owned individually and common areas that are owned jointly by all per-
sons in the complex. 50 When the owner of a condominium does not pay
taxes, a lien results against his unit but not against the entire building.51
The purchaser at a tax sale becomes a tenant in common with the other
owners only in hallways, stairways, elevators, and other common areas,
and thus cannot force a sale of the entire building. 52 Also, because of this
statutory provision, he could not force a partition sale of the common
areas. This type of approach, i.e., selling only a portion of a building,
would protect the nondelinquent owner from a partition sale, but
statutory provisions may be required to cover problems concerning owner-
ship, upkeep, and combined use of common areas.- 3
Aside from failing to describe the attachment of a tax lien to partially
exempt property, Barnes does not describe a valuation method for nonex-
empt portions of that property. The value of the taxable portion of the
building must be determined before a tax can be collected. 54 The amount
49. See Hospital Purchasing Serv. v. City of Hastings, 11 Mich. App. 500,
509, 161 N.W.2d 759, 763 (1963). OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5718.04 (Page 1980)
allows buildings owned by one person to be divided and separately assessed if such
portion constitutes a "separate entity." A floor of a building is considered to be a
separate entity. See New Haven Church of Missionary Baptist v. Board of Tax
Appeals, 9 Ohio St. 2d 53, 57, 223 N.E.2d 366, 369 (1967).
50. See generally RSMO §§ 448.010-.220 (1978).
51. Id. § 448.100. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3102 (1976) (provides that
condominium unit may include enclosed space on floor if space has seperate exit
to public street or highway); UNIFORM CONDOMINIUM ACT § 1-105 (provides for
sepprate assessment of unit owner's interest).
52. RSMO § 448.070 (1978).
53. See Defenders of the Christian Faith v. Board of County Comm'rs., 219
Kan. 181, 188, 547 P.2d 706, 711 (1976); Barnes Hosp. v. Leggett, 589 S.W.2d at
245 (Rendlen, J., dissenting).
54. RSMo § 137.085.2 (1978) provides that a lien accrues after taxes are
assessed and levied against a property. See McAnally v. Little River Drainage
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could be ascertained by determining the intrinsic value of the nonexempt
portion 5 or by determining its rental value. 56 Alternatively, the value of
the entire building could be determined and a tax assessed on the propor-
tion of that amount that the area of the nonexempt part of the building
bears to the total building.67 By looking only at the space occupied by the
nonexempt portion, the assessment does not take into account the possible
improvements on the nonexempt portion or the portion's rental value. If
taxes are assessed against the value of the unit itself, the form of assessment
used in similar situations will be followed.
The Barnes decision is a mixed blessing for tax exempt entities.
Because of the apparent abandonment of the principal use rule, the occa-
sional use of an exempt building for a nonexempt purpose now may sub-
ject the entire building to taxation. On the other hand, adoption of the
partial exemption rule will allow a tax exempt entity to rent a portion of its
building to a commercial enterprise without subjecting the entire building
to taxation. The Barnes court did not describe the attachment of a tax lien
to a partially exempt building or the method of valuation to be used in
assessing a portion of that building. Unless the legislature provides ap-
propriate standards, the courts probably will reformulate this area of tax
law on an ad hoc basis.
JANI LYNN SPURGEON
55. See First Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of Chicago, 26 Ill. 482,
488-89 (1861); City of Auburn v. YMCA, 86 Me. 244, 248, 29 A. 992, 993 (1894);
City of Cambridge v. Middlesex County Comm'rs, 114 Mass. 337, 339-40 (1874).
56. Board of Home Missions v. City of Philadelphia, 266 Pa. 405, 411-12,
109 A. 664, 665-66 (1920).
57. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 246-32(d) (Supp. 1980) provides for the pro rata
taxation of partially exempt buildings based on the percentage of space occupied
by the nonexempt part.
1981]
11
Spurgeon: Spurgeon: Partial Exemption from Property Taxes
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
